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In a classic work of American constitutionalism, Bruce Ackerman refers to the
“constitutional moments” that define the political arrangements enshrined in a
Constitution. In Ackerman’s work this development takes place in a paradoxical way,
because such “constitutional moments” of US history do not involve an amendment
of the written Constitution. They simply happen and then the Constitution changes
forever, but not in writing.
EU Law has had its own share of constitutional moments. In a process characterized
by integration through law, these moments have traditionally taken place in the
terrain of the law and lawyers, mostly through judgments and then implemented
through practice. Van Gend en Loos was a constitutional moment. The rebellion
of constitutional courts against unbridled integration, starting with the German
Constitutional Court in the Maastricht decision, was another constitutional moment.
The discoveryof EU fundamental rights as general principles of EU law was another
“constitutional moment”.
Last week another constitutional moment took place. In a rather technical area of
law, the Statute of the European System of Central Banks, the Court of Justice
ruled for the first time in a case that ensued in the annulment of a decision of a
Member State. The Court did not declare that a Member State had failed to fulfill
its obligations under EU Law. What the Court did was much more ambitious, for
it annulled an act rendered by an authority of a Member State and extricated it
from the domestic legal order. For the very first time, EU Law entered fully into the
legal order of a Member State, declared a breach within the domestic legal order
and eradicated the national legal act ipso iure. There was no need for the Member
State to take any appropriate measures. No need for national courts to ensure the
fulfilment of the duties enshrined in EU Law. The EU legal order did the job for them.
In the case of Rimsevics and ECB/Latvia (C-202 and 238/18), the Court was
called to rule on the grounds of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European
System of Central Banks. This provision is, in the words of a dear colleague, an
“extravagant rule”, unparalleled in the Treaties. It contains a remedy that looks
like an infringement action, but it walks like an action of annulment. It empowers
the governor of a national central bank, or the Governing Council of the ECB, to
challenge before the Court of Justice the decision of a national authority to remove
the governor from office if the removal has taken place disregarding the conditions
established in the Treaties. When Mr. Rimsevics, Governor of the Central Bank of
Latvia, was provisionally suspended from office as a result of criminal investigations,
Article 14.2 of the Statute was the obvious provision to apply.
Before I continue, just a quick disclaimer: although I represented one of the parties in
this case, the following lines are a purely personal account and view of the judgment.
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But as the reader will quickly note, it is no provocation to argue that the Court has
crossed a Rubicon, a constitutional Rubicon that allows no turning back.
Contrary to the opinion of Advocate General Kokott, who purported that the Court
should render a declarative judgment (in line with the requests of the applicants),
the final decision was much bolder. After considering the features of Article 14.2 of
the Statute, the Court, sitting in Grand Chamber, ruled that the action provided for in
Article 14.2 of the Statute “has as its purpose the annulment of the decision taken to
relieve a governor of a national central bank from office”.
The Court reviewed the terms and the evidence provided by the Latvian authorities
and ruled that Article 14.2 had been breached. Mr. Rimsevics was removed from
office without complying with the substantive requirements provided in the Statute.
As a result, and here comes the constitutional moment, the Court “hereby annuls
the decision of the Korupcijas nov#ršanas un apkarošanas birojs (Anti-Corruption
Office, Latvia) of 19 February 2018 in so far as it prohibits Mr Ilm#rs Rimš#vi#s from
performing his duties as Governor of the Central Bank of Latvia”.
In all its technicality, this rather simple statement hides a revolution with the potential
of changing EU law forever. Despite its differences with public international law, EU
law has remained faithful to basic principles of international orthodoxy, including the
separation of legal orders that precludes international courts from judicially reviewing
the legality of State action. The infringement procedure is a good example of how
convention has prevailed in Luxembourg, whereby judgments are set to declare that
a Member State has failed to comply with its obligations, but no annulment occurs
directly in the judgment. The same happens in preliminary references in which
national law is indirectly reviewed, where the Court limits its decision to state that EU
law must be interpreted in the sense that it is opposed, or not opposed, to a rule of
national law. The national court does the rest, including the purge or setting aside of
the national act.
In Rimsevics and ECB/Latvia the Court has taken an additional step by declaring
the breach and, immediately after, annulling the national act that incurred in such a
breach. The annulment or repeal of national law is not left to the national authorities,
but quite the contrary: it is left to the Court to purge the rule itself, irrespective of the
author or position of the authority rendering the rule. If the rule would have been
a constitutional provision, the Court would annul. If the rule would have been a
judgment of a national court, the Court would annul. The fact that the annulled act
was an individual decision of an administrative body does not deprive the judgment
of its seismic impact.
One could argue that the case is limited to a very specific provision that allowed the
Court to do precisely that: annul a national act. But there is nothing further from the
truth: Article 14.2 of the Statute makes no reference to the annulment of a national
act, it simply conveys certain features of an action of annulment, but at the same
time it also shows significant traits of an infringement action. The decision to annul
a national act was not evidently and unconditionally provided in a Treaty provision.
It is the interpretation of the Court that has managed to exert such an extraordinary
effect, unparalleled in international law and EU law itself.
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The rationale underlying the Court’s decision is quite straight forward. According
to the Court, “the ESCB represents a novel legal construct in EU law which
brings together national institutions, namely the national central banks, and an
EU institution, namely the ECB, and causes them to cooperate closely with each
other, and within which a different structure and a less marked distinction between
the EU legal order and national legal orders prevails” (italics added).
Thus, one could argue that this result is confined to the European System of Central
Banks and no more. But think twice. “Novel legal constructs” are constantly in the
making in the EU. Just take a glimpse at the recently created European Prosecutor’s
Office, in which another “novel legal construct” has been put into place to safeguard
the financial interests of the EU. If in the future the Court strikes down a national
criminal judgment on the grounds that the European Prosecutor’s Office is a “novel
legal construct” within which “a different structure and a less marked distinction
between the EU legal order and national legal orders prevail”, the assertion’s
premiss would be correct. The same applies to the Single Supervisory Mechanism,
whereby the ECB implements national law, and national authorities enforce EU
law and ECB instructions. Novel legal constructs are not the exclusive domain of
monetary policy, and the challenges of European integration are blending EU and
national legal orders in unprecedented ways that blur the distinction between both
systems.
It would be wrong to argue that Rimsevics and ECB/Latvia is an isolated decision.
Quite the contrary: by stepping into national law and purging its legal order in a
way that is unparalleled in international law, the Court of Justice has finally and
fully stepped into the shoes of a national court. In fact, if this judgment is seen
together with the Court’s efforts to protect the independence and integrity of national
judiciaries, the overall effect is one in which a newCourt has emerged. A Court
sitting at a constitutional apex, assisting national courts when their integrity is
undermined, confronting Member States that drift away from the rule of law, and
annulling national acts when necessary, particularly in areas in which a less marked
distinction between the EU legal order and national legal orders prevail.
The final portrait emerging from this description is a genuine constitutional moment,
crossing a Rubicon through the northern route, via Latvia.
This article has previously been posted on the author’s blog Despite our Differences
and is reposted here with kind permission.
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